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Abstract
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of
alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their
membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not
only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that,
under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability
and voter's sovereignty.
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1 Introduction
Most of voting theory studies the static problem of how societies select an alternative from
a given set of potential choices. However, the set of members belonging to a society often
evolve over time. Moreover, this evolution partly depends on the selected alternative. If
membership is voluntary, members might leave the society if the chosen alternative makes
it undesirable. This, in turn, might cause that other members (who also care about who
belongs to the society) might now nd undesirable to belong to the society and leave as
well.1 We model this strategic problem as a two-stage game in which members rst choose
(by a voting procedure) an alternative and then, after knowing the chosen alternative, they
decide whether to stay or to exit the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions
on preferences, the equilibria of this game satisfy two basic properties. We rst show that,
whenever preference proles are monotonic, any equilibrium is stable in the sense that (after
knowing the chosen alternative and the nal composition of the society) members who have
decided to remain in the society do not want to exit (internal stability) and members who
have decided to leave the society do not want rejoin it (external stability). Second, we show
that for the case of a society using voting by committees to select its new members (as
in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991), and provided that preference proles are also
candidate separable, any undominated equilibrium strategy satises voters sovereignty in
the sense that unanimously good candidates are elected and unanimously bad candidates
are not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the preliminaries and Section 3
presents the results.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the initial set of members of a society who must rst choose an
alternative from a non-empty set X and then, knowing the chosen alternative x 2 X, decide
to stay or to leave the society. A nal society [x; S] consists of the chosen alternative x 2 X
and the subset of members S 2 2N that have chosen to remain in the society. Members
have preferences over X  2N , the set of all possible nal societies. Each member i 2 N
has a preference relation Ri over X  2N , where Ri is a complete, reexive and transitive
binary relation (Pi and Ii are the strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by Ri)
satisfying the following four conditions:
(C1) Strictness: For all x; y 2 X and S; T 2 2N such that i 2 S \ T and [S; x] 6= [T; y],
1See Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001), Barberà and Perea (2002), Granot, Maschler, and Shalev
(2002), Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2004, 2006, and 2007), and Massó and Nicolò (2008) for
dynamic analisys of voting.
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either [x; S]Pi [y; T ] or [y; T ]Pi [x; S].
(C2) Indi¤erence: For all x 2 X and all S 2 2N , i =2 S if and only if [x; S] Ii [x; ;].
Moreover, for all x; y 2 X, [x; ;] Ii [y; ;].
(C3) Non-initial Exit: If ; 2 X, then [;; N ]Pi [;; Nn fig].
(C4) Monotonicity: For all x 2 X and all T ( T 0  N such that i 2 T; [x; T 0]Pi [x; T ] :
Monotonicity means that members consider the exit of other members undesirable, in-
dependently of the chosen alternative. Notice that monotonicity does not impose any con-
dition when comparing two nal societies with di¤erent chosen alternatives. In particular,
monotonicity admits the possibility that member i prefers to belong to a smaller society.
Let Ri be the set of all such preference relations for member i and let R = R1 :::Rn.
We call Ri 2 Ri a monotonic preference relation and R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 R a monotonic
preference prole.
First, to choose an alternative from the set X each member i has to select a particular
message (vote) mi from a given setMi. A voting procedure is a mapping v :M1 :::Mn !
X. Observe that if Mi = Ri for all i 2 N , v is a social choice function.
Second, assume that x 2 X has already been chosen by a voting procedure v. To avoid
to go into the specic details of the exit decisions (the order in which members have to
make their exit decision, as well as their information about the others decisions) we dene
recursively the set of members leaving the society after x is chosen.
Dene the setEA1 (x) = fi 2 N j [x;Nn fig]Pi [x;N ]g, or equivalently, fi 2 N j [x; ;]Pi [x;N ]g.
Namely, EA1(x) is the set of members who want to exit when x is chosen even when the
other members stay. Notice that by (C4), they want to exit independently of the exit deci-
sion of the other members. Let t  1 and assume EAt0 (x) has been dened for all t0 such
that 1  t0  t. Then,
EAt+1 (x) =

i 2 Nn

tS
t0=1
EAt
0
(x)

j [x; ;]Pi

x;Nn

tS
t0=1
EAt
0
(x)

:
At each step, all members who would like to exit do so, given that x has been chosen,
and the current society is formed by all members who in all previous steps wanted to stay
(i.e., the most optimistic circumstance). Let tx be either equal to 1 if EA1 (x) = ; or else be
the smallest positive integer satisfying the property that EAtx (x) 6= ; but EAtx+1 (x) = ;:
Then, dene the exit set after x as EA (x) =
txS
t=1
EAt (x).
Observe that this set only depends on the preference prole R. Motivation and some of
its properties can be found in Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2006). In particular,
EA(x) is the set of members leaving the society if exit is sequential (and they play according
to the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting at x) and it is
independent of the ordering in which members decide (sequentially) whether to stay or to
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exit. The set EA(x) also coincides with the set of members leaving the society if exit is
simultaneous and players eliminate iteratively dominated strategies.
Now, given any voting procedure v : M ! X, we model our voting problem with exit
as the normal form game  v = (N;M;R; ov) where ov is the outcome function such that
for each m 2 M , ov (m) = [v (m) ; NnEA (v (m))] is the nal society. Observe that a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) m of  v imposes to members, through (EA(x))x2X , a minimal rational
behavior in all subgames starting at any x (subgame perfection, for instance, if exit is
sequential).
Later on we will focus on a particular instance of our general problem by introducing the
possibility of exit in the framework studied by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhous (1991),
which corresponds to consider X = 2K , where K is a nite set of candidates to become new
members of the society, and to consider the normal form game  vc = (N;M;R; ovc), where
Mi = 2
K for all i 2 N (each member votes for a subset of candidates) and letting the voting
procedure vc : (2K)N ! 2K be voting by committees. Following Barberà, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou (1991) voting by committees are dened by a collection of families of winning
coalitions (committees), one for each candidate, W = (Wk)k2K . Members vote for a subset
of candidates. To be elected, a candidate must get the vote of all members of some coalition
among those that are winning for that candidate. Formally, a committee for k, denoted by
Wk, is a non-empty family of non-empty coalitions of N satisfying coalition monotonicity
(S 2 Wk and S  T imply T 2 Wk). Given a committee Wk its set of minimal winning
coalitions isWmk  fS 2 Wk j T =2 Wk for all T ( Sg. A voting procedure vc :
 
2K
N ! 2K
is voting by committees if there exists (Wk)k2K such that for all (S1; :::; Sn) 2
 
2K
N
and all
k 2 K,
k 2 vc(S1; :::; Sn)() fi 2 N j k 2 Sig 2 Wk:
We say that vc has no dummies if the corresponding committee W has the property that
for all k 2 K and all i 2 N there exists S 2 Wmk such that i 2 S.
Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) show that for the problem of choosing new
members of the society (without exit), voting by committees is the class of strategy-proof
and onto social choice functions on the domain of separable preferences. We now translate to
our setting with exit the concept of separable preferences. Given Ri 2 Ri and y 2 K, we say
that candidate y is good for i according to Ri whenever [fyg ; N ]Pi [;; N ]; otherwise, we say
that candidate y is bad for i according to Ri. Denote by G (Ri) and B (Ri) the set of good
and bad candidates for i according to Ri, respectively. Given R 2 R, let G (R) =
T
i2N
G (Ri)
the set of unanimously good candidates and B (R) =
T
i2N
B (Ri) the set of unanimously bad
candidates.
Candidate Separability: A preference Ri is candidate separable if for all S  K and
y 2 KnS, and for all T  N such that i 2 T , [S [ fyg ; T ]Pi [S; T ] if and only if y 2 G (Ri).
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Let Si  Ri be the set of monotonic and candidate separable preference relations of i
and let S = S1  ::: Sn.
3 Results
We rst show that for any voting procedure v, all Nash equilibria (NE) of  v satisfy two
stability properties. The rst one is internal stability which says that members who remain
in the society do not want to exit. The second one is external stability which says that
members who leave the society do not want to rejoin it (see Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and
Neme (2004) for a motivation, denition and analysis of these properties in a more general
framework). Formally,
Internal Stability: A strategy prolem 2M satises internal stability if i 2 NnEA (v (m))
implies [v (m) ; NnEA (v (m))]Pi [v (m) ; ;].
External Stability: A strategy prolem 2M satises external stability if i =2 NnEA (v (m))
implies [v (m) ; ;]Pi [v (m) ; NnEA (v (m)) [ fig].
Proposition 1 states that, for any voting procedure v : M ! X, all NE of  v satisfy
internal and external stability.
Proposition 1 Let m 2 M be a NE of  v = (N;M;R; ov), where R 2 R. Then, m
satises internal and external stability.
Proof Let m be a NE of  v and assume rst that i 2 NnEA (v (m)). Hence, i =2
EAtv(m)+1 (v (m)). By (C2), [v (m) ; NnEA (v (m))]Pi [v (m) ; ;]. Thus, m satises internal
stability.
Assume now that i =2 NnEA (v (m)). Therefore, there exists t such that i 2 EAt (v (m)) :
Hence, [v (m) ; ;]Pi

v (m) ; Nn

t 1S
t0=1
EAt
0
(v (m))

. SinceNnEA (v (m))  Nn

t 1S
t0=1
EAt
0
(v (m))

and Ri is monotonic,
v (m) ; Nn

t 1S
t0=1
EAt
0
(v (m))

Pi [v (m) ; (NnEA (v (m))) [ fig] :
By transitivity of Pi, [v (m) ; ;]Pi [v (m) ; (NnEA (v (m))) [ fig]. Thus, m satises external
stability. 
Internal stability follows immediately from the denition of EA(x), independently of the
monotonicity of the preference prole. However, the example below illustrates the fact that
if the preference prole is non-monotonic, a NE of  v may not satisfy external stability.
Example Let N = f1; 2; 3g be a society whose members have to decide whether or not
to admit candidate y as a new member of the society (i.e., X = f;; yg). Let the voting
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procedure vc1 be voting by quota 1; that is, y is chosen if and only if at least a member
votes for it. Consider rst the non-monotonic preference prole R, additively representable
by the following table
u1 u2 u3
1 1  8 1
2 2 5  10
3 4 12 15
y 100  7  8
;
where the number in each cell represents the utility each member i 2 N assigns to members
in N , as well as to candidate y (we normalize by setting ui (;) = 0 for all i 2 N and by
saying that if i =2 T then, the utility of [x; T ] is 0). That is, for all i 2 N , all x; x0 2 f;; yg,
and all T; T 0 2 2N ; [x; T ]Pi [x0; T 0] if and only if8><>:
P
j2T
ui (j) + ui (x) >
P
j2T 0
ui (j) + ui (x
0) if i 2 T \ T 0P
j2T
ui (j) + ui (x) > 0 if i 2 T but i =2 T 0:
Notice that, by the indi¤erence condition (C2), if i =2 T and i =2 T 0 then, [x; T ] Ii [x0; T 0].
Notice thatR2 andR3 are not monotonic ([;; f2; 3g]P2 [;; N ] and [;; f1; 3g]P3 [;; N ]). Clearly
EA (;) = ;. Moreover, EA1 (y) = f3g, EA2 (y) = f2g, and EA3 (y) = ;. Hence, EA (y) =
f2; 3g. Let m be such that vc1 (m) = ;. Then, mi = ; for all i 2 N . If member 1 votes for
y instead of voting for ;, vc1 (y;m 1) = y and hence,
vc1 (y;m 1) ; NnEA
 
vc1 (y;m 1)

= [y; f1g]P1 [;; N ] =

vc1 (m) ; NnEA  vc1 (m) ;
which means that m is not a NE of  vc
1
.
It is easy to see that [y; f1g] is the nal society generated by the NE strategy m =
(y; ;; ;). Moreover, it is the unique nal society that can be generated by a NE of  vc1. But
m does not satisfy external stability because [y; f1; 3g]P3 [y; ;]. 
We now ask whether in the context of selecting new members of the society, any NE of
the game  vc = (N;
 
2K
N
; R; ovc) satises the property that unanimously good candidates
are chosen while unanimously bad ones are not. Formally,
Voters Sovereignty: A strategy prolem 2M of  vc = (N;  2KN ; R; ovc) satises voters
sovereignty if G (R)  vc (m)  KnB (R) :
Proposition 2 Let vc :
 
2K
N ! 2K be a voting by committees without dummies and let
R 2 S. Then, the strategy mi of voting for a common bad (mi\B (R) 6= ;) and the strategy
~mi of not voting for a common good (G (R)\ (Kn ~mi) 6= ;) are dominated strategies in  vc.
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Proof We will only show that to vote for a common bad is a dominated strategy. The
proof that to not vote for a common good is also a dominated strategy is similar and left
to the reader. Let i 2 N and mi 2 2K be such that y 2 mi \ B (R). We will show that
the strategy m0i = min fyg dominates mi. Fix m i 2 M i and consider the two subsets of
candidates vc (m) and vc (m) n fyg. We rst prove the following claim:
Claim: EA (vc (m) n fyg)  EA (vc (m)).
Proof of the Claim: By denition, EA (vc (m) n fyg) =
T 0S
t=1
EAt (vc (m) n fyg) and
EA (vc (m)) =
TS
t=1
EAt (vc (m)) ; where T 0 = tvc(m)nfyg and T = tvc(m). We rst establish
that EA1 (vc (m) n fyg)  EA (vc (m)). Assume j 2 EA1 (vc (m) n fyg). Then,
[vc (m) n fyg ; ;]Pj [vc (m) n fyg ; N ] : (1)
Since y 2 B (Rj) and Rj is candidate separable, [vc (m) n fyg ; N ]Pj [vc (m) ; N ]. Therefore,
by (C2), (1), and transitivity of Rj we conclude that
[vc (m) ; ;]Pj [vc (m) ; N ] :
Thus, j 2 EA1 (vc (m))  EA (vc (m)). Assume now that EAt (vc (m) n fyg)  EA (vc (m))
for all t = 1; :::; t0   1; where 2  t0  T 0: We now prove that EAt0 (vc (m) n fyg) 
EA (vc (m)). Suppose not. Then, there exists j 2 EAt0 (vc (m) n fyg) such that j =2
EA (vc (m)). Since j 2 EAt0 (vc (m) n fyg) ;
[vc (m) n fyg ; ;]Pj

vc (m) n fyg ; Nn

t0 1S
t=1
EAt (vc (m) n fyg)

:
Then, 
vc (m) n fyg ; Nn

t0 1S
t=1
EAt (vc (m) n fyg)

Pj [vc (m) n fyg ; NnEA (vc (m))]
because preferences are monotonic and
t0 1S
t=1
EAt (vc (m) n fyg)  EA (vc (m)) by assumption.
Since y 2 B (Rj) and Rj is candidate separable,
[vc (m) n fyg ; NnEA (vc (m))]Pj [vc (m) ; NnEA (vc (m))] :
Moreover,
[vc (m) ; NnEA (vc (m))]Pj [vc (m) ; ;]
because j =2 EA (vc (m)) : Hence, by transitivity of Rj, [vc (m) n fyg ; ;]Pj [vc (m) ; ;], which
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contradicts (C2). Therefore, the Claim is proved.
We now compare the outcomes ovc (m0i;m i) and o
vc (mi;m i) in the three following
mutually exclusive cases:
Case 1: i 2 EA (vc (m) n fyg). By the above Claim, i 2 EA (vc (m)). Therefore, by (C2),
ovc (m0i;m i) Iio
vc (mi;m i).
Case 2: i =2 EA (vc (m) n fyg) and i 2 EA (vc (m)). Hence,
[vc (m) n fyg ; NnEA (vc (m) n fyg)]Pi [vc (m) n fyg ; ;] Ii [vc (m) ; ;] :
Since vc (m0i;m i) is equal to either vc (m) or vc (m) n fyg,
ovc (m0i;m i) = [vc (m
0
i;m i) ; NnEA (vc (m0i;m i))]
Ri [vc (mi;m i) ; NnEA (vc (mi;m i))]
= ovc (mi;m i) :
Case 3: i =2 EA (vc (m) n fyg) and i =2 EA (vc (m)). Hence,
[vc (m) n fyg ; NnEA (vc (m) n fyg)] Pi [vc (m) n fyg ; NnEA (vc (m))]
Pi [vc (m) ; NnEA (vc (m))] ;
where the two strict preferences follow from monotonicity (and the above Claim) and can-
didate separability of Ri, respectively.
Since vc is without dummies we can nd I 2 Wmy such that i 2 I: Take mj =
fyg for all j 2 I n fig ; mj = ; for all j 2 N n I; and m0i = ;. Remember that
y 2 mi: Then, vc
 
mi;m

 i

= fyg and vc  m0i;m i = ;, and hence, by (C3), i =2
EA
 
vc
 
mi;m

 i
 n fyg=EA  vc  m0i;m i=EA (;) = ;: By (C2) and (C3), if i 2 EA (y)
then
ovc
 
m0i;m

 i

= [N; ;]Pi [;; ;] Ii [fyg ; ;] Ii [fyg ; N n EA (y)] = ovc
 
mi;m

 i

:
Since y 2 BK (Ri) and Ri 2 Si, if i =2 EA (y) then
ovc
 
m0i;m

 i

= [;; N ]Pi [fyg ; N n EA (y)] = ovc
 
mi;m

 i

:
In both cases, ovc
 
m0i;m

 i

Pio
vc
 
mi;m

 i

: Therefore, ovc (m0i;m i)Rio
vc (mi;m i) for all
m i and there exists at least one m i 2M i for which ovc
 
m0i;m

 i

Pio
vc
 
mi;m

 i

: Thus,
strategy mi is dominated by strategy m0i. 
Remark In Proposition 2 we assumed that the voting by committees vc had no dummies.
Notice that if member i is a dummy for y, then to votemi and to votemin fyg are equivalent
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strategies for member i because, independently of what the rest of members are voting, a
vote of mi or mi n fyg leads to the same nal outcome.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.
Corollary Let m 2M be an undominated NE of  vc =

N;
 
2K
N
; R; ovc

where R 2 S
and vc is voting by committees without dummies. Then, m satises voters sovereignty.
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